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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
R O B E R T B. H A N S E N ,
Plaintiff, Respondent,
and Cross-Appellant,
\ Case No.
13276

PETROF TRADING
COMPANY, INC.,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF T H E NATURE
OF T H E CASE
This is an appeal from the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment of the Third District
Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, dismissing
with prejudice the Appellant's counter-claim against the
Respondent which sought recovery against the Respondent on the grounds of professional malpractice.
1
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DISPOSITION OF T H E L O W E R COURT
The case was tried on the 7th day of September,
1972, and the counter-claim of the Appellant against the
Plaintiff was ordered dismissed by the court on the
grounds that the counter-claim of the Appellant was
filed beyond the period of the Statute of Limitations.
The request of the Respondent and Cross-Appellant for
interest on the sum claimed due was denied by the court
on the grounds that the Respondent and Cross-Appellant had failed to comply with legislation requiring the
disclosure of interest charges and on the grounds that
the Respondent and Cross-Appellant had failed to include such interest charges in periodic billings to the
Appellant.

R E L I E F S O U G H T ON A P P E A L
The Appellant seeks a reversal of the lower court
ruling dismissing the Appellant's counter-claim and for
an Order remanding the case to the Third District Court
for the County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, for trial.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In October of 1966, the Respondent was retained as
counsel for the Appellant to collect a sum due to the
Appellant from a Utah corporation, I R E C O , Inc. The
original cause of action was filed in the United States
District Court for the District of Utah for the Central
Division in that the amount in controversy exceeded Ten

2
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Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) and that the parties
were residents of different states. I n December of 1966,
this original case was dismissed based on representations
of the Defendant's counsel to the effect that a large payment had recently reduced the amount in controversy to
less than Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00). The
representation was subsequently discovered to be false
and the case was re-filed in the United States District
Court for the District of Utah and was styled Petrof
Trading Company, Inc., v. Intermountain Research
and Engineering Company, Inc., Case No. 116-67.
During the discovery phase of Case 116-67, the Respondent advised the President of the Appellant corporation to retain the services of Arthur H . Nielson as
counsel for trial of the case. The Respondent assisted
Arthur H . Nielson in the discovery proceedings of the
case and performed his last service in Case 116-67 on
approximately October 9, 1968.
Case No. 116-67 went to trial and the Appellant
corporation was successful in a portion of its claims. The
case was appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit which substantially affirmed the finding of the
District Court.
During the appeal proceedings, and subsequent to
the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit, the president of the Appellant corporation, Mr. Julius Petrofsky, reviewed certain court
records and discovered a deposition which had been
taken at the instance and request of the Respondent
\
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which was never used in Case No. 116-67. Mr. Petrofsky
also discovered other acts which may have constituted
professional negligence on the part of Respondent and
when this case was filed by the Respondent on July 31,
1970, the Appellant began to develop the issues which
subsequently led to the filing of a Second Amended
Answer and Counter-Claim by Appellant's then counsel,
Reese C. Anderson, on the 19th day of August, 1972,
less than four (4) years after the last services rendered
by the Respondent and less than four (4) years after
the discovery by the president of the Appellant corporation of certain acts in the nature of professional malpractice on the part of Respondent. The reply to the Second
Amended Answer and Counter-Claim was filed by the
Appellant on August 19, 1972, under the signature of
the Respondent, Robert B. Hansen.
The case had been set for trial many times and on
the date of the filing of the Second Amended Answer
and Counter-Claim and the reply to the Counter-Claim
the case had been set for trial on the 7th day of September, 1972.
On the 28th day of August, 1972, the Respondent
raised, for the first time, the contention that the claim of
professional malpractice was barred by the provisions of
Title 78, Chapter 12, Section 25, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, as amended. That statute provides a four (4) year
statute of limitations for claims such as the counter-claim
of the Appellant for professional malpractice. The
Amended Reply to Counter-Claim which raised the
statute of limitations defense was received by counsel

4
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for the Appellant less than one (1) week before the trial
of the matter.
At the trial on September 7, 1972, the Respondent
presented his case-in-chief and the court advised the
Appellant that argument would be necessary prior to
taking evidence on the Appellant's counter-claim.
Thereupon, the then counsel for the Appellant went forward to present his evidence regarding the amount in
controversy, payments which were made, over-charges
which were claimed by the Appellant and subsequently
proven.
In accordance with the instructions of the court,
counsel for the Appellant asked no questions designed to
elicit evidence of the Appellant's counter-claim. At the
conclusion of the evidence, the court required counsel for
the Appellant to go forward with a proffer of evidence
on which the Appellant's counter-claim was based for
the sole purpose of determining whether or not the claim
was barred by the statute of limitations. The court did
not place the burden upon the Respondent to affirmatively prove facts showing that the statutes of limitations
barred the claims of the Appellant. Upon receiving a
proffer of evidence from the then counsel for the Appellant and upon hearing arguments of counsel, the court
found that the president of the Appellant corporation
should have discovered the acts of alleged professional
negligence and sought relief on those claims before the
filing of the counter-claim on August 19, 1972.
The court also found that the provisions of the Utah
Uniform Consumer Credit Code applied to the interest
5
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sought by the Respondent inasmuch as no interest was
claimed until after the Act went into effect on July 1,
1969, and on the ground that a fair reading of the Utah
Uniform Consumer Code and the statute under which
the Respondent claimed interest led the court to the conclusion that the statute under which the Respondent
claimed interest was modified insofar as it was inconsistent with the provisions of the subsequent Utah Uniform
Consumer Credit Code. The court also found that there
was no agreement to pay interest for the professional
charges and that the Respondent made no disclosure to
the Appellant of its intention to charge interest until the
filing of this law suit on July 31, 1970.
After the filing of Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law, and a Judgment for the Respondent in the
amount of Fifteen Hundred Ninety Eight Dollars and
60/100 ($1,598.60), the amount of the judgment was
paid by the Appellant and accepted by the Respondent
in satisfaction of the Judgment.
Post trial proceedings were conducted specifically
directed to the applicability of the Statute of Limitations
defense, post-trial relief was denied, and appeal was
taken.
ARGUMENT
P O I N T I.
T H E T R I A L COURT E R R E D I N DISMISSI N G A P P E L L A N T - D E F E N D A N T S COUNTE R - C L A I M ON T H E G R O U N D S T H A T T H E
6
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STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS H A D E X P I R E D P R I O R TO T H E F I L I N G O F T H E C O U N T ER-CLAIM.
The Statute of Limitations applied by the court to
this case to bar the recovery of the Appellant on his
counter-claim is 78-12-25 Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
as amended, which provides a four (4) year statute of
limitations. Counsel for the Appellant believes that this
is the applicable statute of limitations for professional
malpractice cases against attorneys. Throughout most of
the courts of the United States and specifically in the
courts of Utah, statutes of limitations defenses are to be
affirmatively plead and proven by the party asserting the
statute of limitations defense. DeVas v. Noble, 13 Utah
2d 133, 369 P.2d 290 (1962), Kimball V. McCormick,
70 Utah 189, 259 P . 313, (1927), Thomas v. Glendinning, 13 Utah 47, 44 P . 652, (1896), Tate v. Rose, 35
Utah 229, 99 P.1003 (1909).
The burden of affirmatively proving a particular
fact requires the party asserting the fact to come forward and produce evidence, either by testimony or by
documents, to the effect that the asserted statute of limitations applies. In the instant case, the trial court erred
in shifting the burden to the Appellants to prove that the
statute of limitations did not apply and, in fact, required
the Appellant meet that inappropriate burden of proof
by a proffer of evidence. I n view of the very short notice
given to counsel for the Appellant at the trial, sufficient
time did not exist to prepare and martial the facts appropriate to such a demand by the court. In an effort to ob7

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

tain post trial relief, the president of the Appellant corporation submitted a detailed affidavit of the evidence
to be presented through his testimony. The affidavit is
in the record detailing the claims of the Appellant. Supporting documents and expert opinion evidence were not
presented. Of course, the counsel for Appellant, during
the trial, would not foresee the shift by the court of the
burden of proof and, therefore, could not adequately
prepare for the trial court's request.
The Appellant contends that the trial court committed reversible error in shifting the burden of proof
and in subsequently dismissing the Appellant's counterclaim.
The more substantial issue raised in this case is the
question which this court finally resolved for medical
malpractice cases in Christiansen v. Rees, 20 Utah 2d
199, 436 P.2d 435 (1968).
I n Christiansen v. Rees, supra, this court adopted
the so-called "discovery rule" for medical malpractice
cases and specifically over-ruled all prior pronouncements of the court on the issue. The trial court in the instant case made no specific finding of the date on which
the president of the Appellant corporation should have
discovered the acts of professional malpractice which
formed the basis of his counter-claim and instead made
the general finding that the acts of negligence "should
have been discovered" more than four (4) years prior
to the filing of the counter-claim on August 19, 1972.
Without appropriate evidence being taken under an appropriate burden of proof, it was impossible for the trial
8
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court to make specific findings of fact on that issue.
Without such specific evidence and without specific
findings, it was error for the court to dismiss the counterclaim of the Appellant and forever foreclose the Appellant from having his day in court on the allegations of his
counter-claim.
At the trial of the matter, all parties conceded that
the last services rendered by the Respondent were performed in September or October of 1968; a formal withdrawal of counsel by Mr. Hansen was never filed, and
he ultimately received payment from the Appellant in
satisfaction of the judgment rendered in 116-67. Because
of the relationship of trust between an attorney and his
client, a client generally should not be expected to discover professional negligence on the part of an attorney
until their relationship of attorney and client is terminated.
In Holland v. Morton, 10 Utah 2d 390, 353 P.2d
989 (1960), this court held that clients are under no duty
to maintain a careful supervisory check on the actions of
their attorney. In the relationship of trust between an attorney and his client, clients are entitled to trust their
counsel and until that relationship of trust is terminated,
there should be no expectancy that a client will discover
an act of professional malpractice.
The court concluded in Holland v. Morton, supra,
that the attorney's duty to make a full and fair disclosure
to his clients prevented the applicable statute of limitations in that case from running until termination of the
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attorney-client relationship or until discovery of the
fraud.
Holland v. Morton, supra, however, is not directly
in point in this situation and does not resolve the issue for
us of when the statute of limitations begins to run in a
professional malpractice case against an attorney.
In other states, courts have adopted the rule that
the statute of limitations in professional negligence cases
involving attorneys does not begin to run until termination of the attorney-client relationship. In Tuck v.
Theusen, 10 Cal. App. 3d 193, 88 Cal. Rptr. 759 (1970),
the California Court of Appeals held that the statute of
limitations began to run on the day that the plaintiff obtained new counsel and reasoned that the defendant's
duty to render legal services ceased with the substitution
of another attorney and since, until the time the attorney
was replaced, he was under a continuing duty to correct
any negligent acts which may have occurred during the
relationship. In Keaton v. Colby, 27 Ohio St.2d 234,
271 N.E.2d 772, (1970), the Ohio Supreme Court
adopted the rule that the statute of limitations for professional negligence cases against attorneys begins to
run at the termination date of the attorney-client relationship. I n Nellas v. Loucas, 191 S.E.2d 165, (1972),
the Virginia court adopted the so-called "Termination
Rule" in attorney malpractice cases and cited for authority the decision in Keaton, supra, reasoning that until the
attorney-client relationship terminates, the client has no
duty to discover professional malpractice and bring a
law suit while the attorney is in the employ of the client.
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I n the case of Wilson v. Econom, 56 Misc. 2d 272,
288 N.Y.Supp.2d 381 (1968), the New York court held
that the continuing representation of a client by an attorney extends the statute of limitations during the
period of the attorney's representation of the client and
thereby adopted the " Termination Rule" in the State of
New York.
This court in Christiansen v. Rees, supra, discussed
the same policy considerations which led the court to
adopt the discovery rule in medical malpractice cases.
Different policy considerations apply to the attorneyclient relationship inasmuch as a client generally has a
trust in his attorney at least until the termination of the
relationship and that until that basis is extinguished,
either by the attorney's negligent acts or by the conclusion of the case, the client is under no duty to assume
that the attorney may have committed an act of professional negligence.
In most cases, an attorney has exclusive custody of
records, evidence, research and other pertinent materials
to his client's case which are not usually available to
others having the professional qualifications to determine whether or not an act of professional negligence
has occurred. Without access to such materials, and particularly where an attorney has made representations to
avoid the discovery by his client of negligent acts, a
client cannot make a judgment of whether or not professional negligence has occurred. Conceivably, an attorney
could "stall" or foreclose inquiry into his work until the
11
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statute of limitations barred recovery under the rule applied by the trial court in the instant case.
Justice Henroid, dissenting in Christiansen, supra,
also raises the issue which should lead to the adoption of
the termination rule for the State of Utah. In the dissenting opinion, Justice Henroid argues that, for example, an error by an attorney in the examination of an
abstract of title may not be discovered until many years
after the act of negligence and that extending the statute
of limitations for such an unreasonable period of time
would work a hardship on both parties.
Justice Henroid argues that the limitation rules are
appropriately the function of the legislature. The legislature, however, has not seen fit to foresee all of the possible situations in which statutes of limitations may
apply. Therefore, the courts are called upon to construe
certain common sense rules for the practical application
of the legislative fiat.
Adoption of the termination rule in Utah would provide, for example in the abstract of title situation, that
the statute of limitations begins to run as of the date of
the termination of the attorney-client relationship; i.e.,
on the date on which the attorney's services are completed in the examination of an abstract of title, and that
actions against the attorney for malpractice would be
barred four (4) years after the termination of that relationship. Application of the termination rule to the
facts of this case will result in a reversal of the lower
court's opinion with instructions to determine the exact
12
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date of the attorney's last services and to apply the
statute of limitations accordingly.
Unless the court adopts the termination rule, the
courts of the State of Utah will be continually faced with
the kinds of claims made in this case by the president of
the Appellant corporation, to wit: That the representations by the attorney to him lulled him into a false sense
of security, into believing that no acts of negligence had
been committed, and that the course of professional representation was proceeding in an appropriate fashion. If
the courts are continually required to examine claims of
professional negligence against attorneys where allegations of fraudulent concealments are made such as those
claims made in Holland v. Morton, supra, litigation
could become time-consuming, costly and vituperative
for the public, the courts, and the attorneys who are required to defend claims of fraudulent concealment.
From every perspective, it appears that the court
should adopt the so-called "Termination Rule" for the
State of Utah and in so doing, should reverse the lower
court's decision in this case and remand the case for
further consideration.
Respectfully submitted,
Gerald H . Kinghorn
KINGHORN, OBERHANSLY
& O'CONNELL
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
Twelve Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
13
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